This article emphasizes the importance of 'face-saving'and 'reference point'in understanding North Korea' s strategic assessment. In fact, the concept of face-saving has been often discussed in explaining North Korea' s negotiating behavior.
3) North
Koreans are said to have great self-respect and therefore hate to be humiliated. The
North Korean regime will fight to save face, which somewhat explains Pyongyang' s aggressiveness and brinkmanship even when it is in a disadvantageous position.
Nevertheless, North Korea rarely sacrifices its strategic benefit. At times the regime even appears quite practical and displays great effort to maximize its benefit. Both saving face and gaining benefit are important to the North Korean regime. But which one takes precedence when a choice has to be made? Though the regime' s choice may sometimes seem irrational in the eyes of westerners, it may be a rational one by North to feel humiliated and lose face when it believes that it has failed to gain the benefit originally expected. This article examines the concept of 'reference point' ,
arguing that recognizing Pyongyang' s reference point provides a better picture of its internal and external perception and behavior.
Korean thinking.
In order to explain the North Korean rationality, this article hypothesizes that North Korea' s face-saving is closely connected with gaining benefit. In other words, the North Korean regime is more likely to feel humiliated and lose face when it believes that it has failed to gain the benefit originally expected. For this purpose, this article turns its attention to the concept of 'reference point.'
'Reference point'is the cost that a person thinks that he can hardly concede. When people gain more than what they expect, they are happy; however, when the outcome falls short of what they originally anticipated, they are disappointed. If the North Korean regime achieves its reference point, it is satisfied. However, if its reference point is threatened or appears impossible to attain, it is likely to be seriously provoked and become aggressive, because it may feel it is losing face. Thus the identification of the reference point is critical in understanding Pyongyang' s strategic mindset, and helps us understand its rational calculation of costs and benefits. Korea to break out of its security dilemma and save face.
8)
The significance of saving face can be seen most strongly in North Korean attitude toward sovereign rights. Because the concept of sovereign rights has been closely connected to juche ideology and has influenced critically North Korea' s policy decisions, the violation of its sovereign rights by foreign countries is regarded as a humiliation.
The North Korean media often says that "Infringing our sovereign rights and dignity is an act of insult and crime that can never be tolerated," 9) so that "we are always ready to chastise ruthlessly those who provoke us."
10)

From Face-Saving to Reference Point Bias
In order to save face, North Korea may often run risks and appear to behave irrationally. However, saving face does not come at the expense of its strategic interests.
For North Korea, to lose something of strategic interest would be a face-losing loss in itself. In this sense, North Korea' s face-saving attitude is closely related to securing its reference point, which is an act of defending its important strategic position. Because the reference point is the lowest level of expectation that they can tolerate, it is important to know whether the reference point is threatened or not in the negotiation.
If the point cannot be defended, the North Koreans would be much offended and become further aggressive. The reference point is normally the status quo or one' s current position, but in some cases, it may be one' s expectation or aspiration level.
11)
The North Korean regime is more sensitive to defend its original reference point.
Suffering losses in a negotiation is perceived as a loss of face, and every effort is made afterward to recoup those losses. However, if the regime' s negotiating counterpart takes the regime' s loss as a fait accompli, the regime becomes much more belligerent. As it has shown, North Korea hardly yields an inch from its original position. As a result, North Korea' s reference point tends to rise continuously as time passes. The identification of North Korea' s reference point is particularly important because it can have a critical effect on the change in its perception and choice.
Ⅲ. Assessing North Korea' s Reference Point in 2009
The North Korea has never said that it will keep its nuclear weapons program forever. It contends that "We will not need nuclear weapons any longer when America' s nuclear threat on North Korea is removed and its nuclear umbrella on South Korea does not exist."The regime argues that North Korea developed nuclear weapons not because it really wanted them but because the United States pursued a hostile policy toward the North; with the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons hanging over North Korea, the regime believes that any nation in North Korea' s place would understand why the North is developing nuclear weapons. Thus, the implication is that the North will never give up its nuclear weapons without the fundamental elimination of U.S. hostility and nuclear threat.
14)
In fact, North Korea has argued this for a long time. Kim Il-sung once said that "It is the U.S. that raised the suspicion of the North' s non-existent nuclear development and also that actually brought nuclear weapons into the Korean peninsula and threatened us." 15) From the North Korean perspective, the nuclear issue remains defined by Cold
War politics, so they call it the "nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula,"not the 'North We were reminded again of why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the rules once again by testing a rocket that could be used for long-range missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action?not just this afternoon at the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons. Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response, and North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime. And that' s why we must stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course.
21)
In this sense, North Korea does not think that the Obama administration is different from the former Bush administration. 22) 2) North Korea insists on negotiating with the U.S. bilaterally rather than returning to the Six-Party Talks
North Korea has constantly insisted that the nuclear issue should be bilaterally negotiated with the United States. Kim Il-sung once emphasized the inevitability of bilateral talks with the United States, given the origin of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. 23) Also during the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, North Korea' s Foreign Ministry often contended that the "UN Security Council is not a place in which our nuclear problem is discussed," 24) and "Japan and South Korea do not have to pay attention to the DPRK-U.S. talks." 25) In fact, the first nuclear crisis was resolved by bilateral talks, which produced the Geneva Agreed Framework. North Korea believes that six-party talks trample on its sovereign rights and dignity, in particular because the participants to the talks (i.e., China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) have joined in the UN Security Council sanctions against the North-sanctions imposed in response to North' s satellite launch and nuclear test. 27) Particularly, North Korea' s Foreign Minister Pak Ui-Chun stated that North Korea will neither come back to the six-party talks nor be bound by any agreement of the talks. North Korea now deals with the nuclear issue as a nuclear weapons state. North Korea now does not intend to give up its nuclear weapons in return for U.S. diplomatic normalization and economic assistance. It rather insists that nuclear disarmament talks among nuclear weapons states including North Korea is the only means to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. 35) Although North Korea still states that the nuclear issue may be resolved if the U.S. hostility comes to an end, it is unrealistic under the current relations between the U.S. and North Korea. In this sense, North
Korea now attempts to negotiate the nuclear issue as if it had the same status as the United States. Because North Korea sees the issue from the perspective of equal sovereign rights, 36) the nuclear issue is getting much harder to resolve. From this perspective, North Korea justifies its nuclear test as a legitimate right from a nuclear weapons state.
37)
North Korea' s reference point is no longer abandonment of its nuclear program but rather nuclear disarmament as a nuclear weapons state. Because North Korea perceives that only nuclear weapons can guarantee its sovereign rights in the international arena, it is unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons under the current regime. 38) However, the United States is not likely to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. Rather, the Obama administration has set out to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime.
39)
North Korea' s Reference Point in Domestic Politics
1) North Korea sees the leadership succession as a key to regime stability
Since the mid-1990s, many scholars and policy analysts believed that the North Korean regime was eventually about to collapse. 40) Kim Jong-il himself was also concerned about the possibility of political chaos, 41) and many experts on North Korea discussed several scenarios for the country' s future. 42) However, the regime turned out to be strong enough to still "muddle through"its domestic crisis. 43) Rather, Pyongyang had long been aware of such domestic causes of regime instability and had kept any dissent relatively suppressed by reinforcing its control over society. 44) Because North Korea is an extremely controlled and closed society, its leaders might be able to control the domestic situation in a relatively easy manner. The regime has continued to focus on political education and the exertion of systematic social control, so much of the domestic pressure has been managed quite efficiently. 45) In fact, the North' s domestic stability can This is likely to have a strong negative impact on the North Korean economy, which in turn will have clearly a bad influence on its regime stability. For this reason, the North Korean regime makes much more effort to stabilize its domestic regime. It is often assumed that the rocket launch and nuclear test were also designed to deliver a strong message for domestic solidarity. 51) Especially because the support of North Korea' s military is essential in the regime' s leadership succession, some assume that the nuclear test reflects the regime' s hope that it will help ensure a smooth transition of power by showing solidarity with the powerful military groups. On the other hand, others believe that the North Korean regime hopes that a display of technological prowess could serve the domestic regime stability by strengthening the North Korean people' s support for the regime. In fact, the North Korean media has repeatedly praised the regime highly for the accomplishment, 52) and the regime even held mass rallies in Pyongyang to celebrate the successful test of nuclear weapons. 53) In this rally, participants made several speeches that the successful nuclear test was such an achievement of the "military-first"policy, which defends the regime' s highest interest 2) North Korea attempts to secure its leverage and benefit from economic cooperation
As noted above, North Korea underscores the spirit of 'by our nation itself'on the Korean peninsula, because it may give the North some leverage in inter-Korean relations by emphasizing cooperation between the two Koreas. 62) Also regarding the Mt.
Geumgang and KIC projects, the North Korean regime states that they are preferential measures that it graciously granted to South Korea under the spirit of 'by our nation itself." 63) Although North Korea has benefited a lot more from economic cooperation with South Korea, it argues that it is a special favor to the South in deference to the June 15 Joint Declaration. However, North Korea recently declared the preferential measures to be void and called for a new negotiation, arguing that South Korea disavowed completely the spirit of 'by our nation itself.'Because the preference was possible by the declaration, it says that it cannot be granted any longer to those who deny the declaration.
64)
Thus, North Korea' s reference point here is that it can have some leverage from economic cooperation with South Korea and gain benefit from it. Because the economic benefit and political leverage have been difficult to obtain under since the Lee government took power, North Korea has become aggressive.
Ⅳ. Policy Recommendations
This article attempted to explain North Korea' s recent strategic assessment on the Korean peninsula after its rocket launch and nuclear test in 2009. The North Korean regime is thought to behave irrationally because it often accepts the risk of losing some gains, which others normally would not. This article argues that North Korea' s choices reflect its own rationality, which involves defending its position and saving face around its reference point. If it is understood that the North Korean regime has a reference point bias to save face, it is possible to explain and predict its seemingly irrational behavior and to lay out some policy recommendations to guide policy makers in the United States, South Korea, and other neighboring countries.
First of all, it is of central importance to identify North Korea' s reference point and its current situation. If North Korea' s situation is placed above the reference point, it is more likely to be conciliatory, and its willingness to compromise will increase greatly.
However, if its situation is perceived to be below the reference point, it is more likely to be aggressive and provocative, and it will be reluctant to compromise. Thus, it is necessary to recognize correctly North Korea' s reference point and current situation before laying out any policies.
Second, after recognizing North Korea' s reference point, the next step is to understand the reference point gap between North Korea and international society, because narrowing the gap is the key to the resolution of the conflict. If the gap is big and widening, the negotiation is more likely to come to deadlock. Moreover, if North Korea' s overall situation appears to be worsening, widening the gap with its own reference point, the negotiation would be much more difficult. In this situation, there is little 64) Ibid.
chance for North Korea to make a compromise, and it is hard to negotiate when a situation is escalating toward crisis. North Korea normally tries to find an exit out of a crisis while saving face, 65) but it may have much difficulty in backing down unless a face-saving way is provided by the international society. Conversely, if the gap is small, the negotiation is more likely to be successful because there is more chance to compromise.
As explained above and also shown in Table 2 , there was a huge gap of reference point between North Korea and the international society in 2009. Moreover, North Korea' s current situation is seen to be well below the reference point, and it has not reached its reference point after its rocket launch and nuclear test. Thus, North Korea is expected to continue its nuclear confrontation to defend its reference point and save face, meaning the crisis is likely to escalate. Thus, something must be done to narrow the reference point gap between the two camps.
Third, it is recommended that negotiators provide North Korea with a face-saving way to narrow the reference point gap. It would be great if North Korea' s reference point 65) , pp. 89-91. meshed with those of other nations from the beginning, but this is rarely the case. In particular, there was a huge gap of reference point in 2009, and it is necessary for both parties to readjust their reference points. In fact, North Korea' s reference point is usually much higher than others expect. The dilemma here is that North Korea is unwilling to readjust its reference point while the international society cannot accept its reference point as it is. It is not only because accepting North Korea' s unadjusted reference point is a major threat to world peace, but also because North Korea tends to invite further demand once the demand is accommodated. In this sense, it is necessary to provide North Korea with a face-saving way to readjust its reference point, while international society also shows some flexibility.
Will North Korea readjust its reference point? While not an easy task, it is not a mission impossible, because North Korea usually attempts to find an exit even when it is deep in a crisis. The issue here is to distinguish North Korea' s short-term tactical reference point from its long-term strategic one. North Korea is less likely to give up its strategic reference points like regime security, but it may be tempted to readjust its tactical reference points like its policies on the six-party talks, economic cooperation, and so forth. Thus, international society needs to provide North Korea with a facesaving exit and continuously persuade North Korea to change its reference point, informing that brinkmanship will only lead to a loss of face, and thus the regime should make an adjustment.
As a fourth recommendation, policy makers should devise a long-term plan to resolve the problem of North Korea fundamentally, not just to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. For North Korea, the nuclear issue is deeply connected to the regime' s stability and future. The international community also has to face up to the North Korean problem itself and go beyond na1ve engagement, hard-line punishment, and the past strategy of benign neglect. The international society needs to provide North Korea with a face-saving exit even when it is deep in a crisis and to persuade the North to accept such exit plan.
Pyongyang has shown that it is willing to change course to save face, as it did during the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s. At that time, North Korea confronted the United States, but in June 1994 it was suddenly willing to accommodate the U.S. demand, opting for regime survival over UN sanctions and prospective U.S. attack. As This historical example shows that it is possible to narrow the reference points between North Korea and international community, and that coercion without a facesaving plan will not work. In short, to solve the North Korean problem, one must be willing to find a way of getting North Korea to concede and change its reference point while simultaneously saving face, since saving face and defending its reference point are crucial issues to North Korea. 
